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LABOUR LORE AND LABOUR LAW: A NORTH 
AMERICAN VIEW OF THE DANISH EXPERIENCE 
By 
H. W. ARTHURS * 
INTRODUCTION 
THE Danish success in achieving industrial peace is so universally 
acclaimed that a study of it requires no apologies. But apart from 
the intrinsic appeal of a successfully functioning system, a student 
of legal institutions and arrangements cannot fail to gain a deeper 
understanding of his immediate legal environment by examining it 
from a new vantage-point. It is the latter consideration, as much 
as the former, which motivates this study. If, as Holmes says, the 
life of the law is not logic but experience, we should not hesitate to 
profit vicariously from the experience of others. 
I am anxious to point out that I do not read or speak Danish. 
The presence of this language barrier to primary materials forced 
reliance upon two other major sources of information: First, 
translations of basic public documents, English-language pamphlets 
on Danish labour relations and labour law, and the classic study of 
Professor Galenson.1 In so far as insights culled from these sources 
may appear in this study, my debt to them is gratefully acknow- 
ledged. I do not, however, feel entitled to claim the scholarly 
exactitude which can only come from first-hand research. Secondly, 
interviews with persons engaged in labour affairs in Denmark. 
Interviews often reveal attitudes and subtleties not readily discern- 
ible in printed matter; on the other hand the persons interviewed 
unanimously asked, as the price of frankness, assurances that views 
expressed would be reported without attribution of source. Accord- 
ingly, I ask the reader's indulgence for my failure to identify the 
source of many statements. 
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. This study was 
made possible by the generosity of the Canadian Department of Labour- 
Universities Research Committee. Such realism as may flesh the bare bones 
of statutory analysis is entirely attributable to the intellectual hospitality of 
officials of the Danish Government, the Danish Employers' Confederation, 
and the Danish Federation of Trade Unions, together with several individuals 
professionally engaged in labour relations matters. [For a comparative view 
of labour law in other European countries, see Labour Law in Europe: with 
special reference to the Common Market, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly Supplementary Publication No. 5 (1962).-Ed.] 
1 Galenson, The Danish System of Labor Relations, A Study in Industrial 
Peace (1952). 
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THE BACKGROUND 2 
The roots of collective action in Denmark run deep. The medieval 
Guild system, with its tradition of organisation for both masters 
and journeymen, persisted in Denmark, formally, until 1862. By 
this date the industrial revolution had begun, although industry 
was still organised primarily in small workshops employing an 
average of twenty to thirty workers. Significant industrial expan- 
sion dates from about 1870, and was from its inception accompanied 
by the development of organisations of employers and employees. 
Whether these organisations were directly descended from the 
Guilds is a matter of controversy; early attempts at unionism 
certainly stemmed from socialist agitation. There is no doubt, 
however, that dissolution of the Guilds did leave a vacuum in the 
labour market which-given the organisational tradition-was filled 
within twenty-five years by the emergence of centralised union and 
employers' organisations. These central organisations have played 
a pre-eminent role in the development of the Danish labour market, 
and in the rules which govern it. 
Without at this point tracing the internal structure of the 
Danish Employers' Confederation (Dansk Arbejdsgiversforening or 
" D.A.") and the Danish Federation of Trade Unions (De 
Samvirkende Fagforbund, colloquially the " Landsorganisation '" 
or " L.O.") both of these organisations had appeared by 1899, and 
were in that year to meet in a major test of strength. 
A lockout of major proportions was called-involving some 20 
per cent. of the non-agricultural work force-for the purpose of 
waging preventive war against the growing power of the unions. 
The dispute was bitter, long (some 3 million working days were 
lost), and costly to both sides. It is the genius-and the good 
fortune-of the Danes that at this lowest point in their industrial 
relations they were able to lay the groundwork for a remarkably 
stable and workable system. The settlement of the lockout, in 
September 1899, was embodied in a document which has formed 
the basis of substantive Danish labour law down to the present 
(subject, only, to a revision in November 1960). 
THE BASIC AGREEMENT 
A synopsis 3 of the ground rules laid down in this Agreement is 
useful: 
Section 1 (1) In recognition of the desirability of having questions 
concerning wages and working conditions settled by 
2 See Galenson, op. cit., c. 1. 
3 See Appendix 1, infra, for the full text of the " September Agreement " of 
1899, as amended in November 1960. 
JAN. 1963] Labour Lore and Labour Law 249 
the conclusion of collective agreements, if necessary 
with the participation of the central organisa- 
tions, the central organisations bind themselves 
neither directly nor indirectly to obstruct employers 
and workers from organising themselves within 
the organisational framework of the central 
organisations. 
Section 2 (1) When a collective agreement has been concluded, 
and for its duration, no stoppage of work (strike, 
blockade, lockout, or boycott) may be effected 
within the scope of the agreement unless warranted 
by the " Standard Rules for Settlement of Labour 
Disputes " or by existing collective agreements. 
Sympathetic strikes or sympathetic lockouts may, 
however, be effected in accordance with current 
agreements and legal practice. 
(3) & (4) provide for a vote of any group affected by the 
work stoppage, and for notice of any proposed work 
stoppage to the opposite central organisation. 
(5) obliges the central organisation " not to support, 
but by all reasonable means to prevent, unlawful 
stoppages of work " and to bring such stoppages to 
an end. 
Section 3 The central organisations shall be responsible for 
ensuring that agreements concluded between them 
are respected and carried out by all affiliated 
organisations. 
Section 4 (1) guarantees management's rights " to direct and 
distribute work and to use what labour may in their 
judgment be suitable " subject to the responsible 
exercise of this right so as not to violate workers' 
rights. 
(2) prohibits unilateral change of piece rates through 
job re-evaluation unless the worker is compensated 
for any loss. 
(3) provides protection against arbitrary dismissal, and 
the remedy therefor. 
Sections 5 & 6 draw the line between managerial personnel and 
employees. 
Section 7 (1) provides for three months' notice of termination of 
collective agreements. 
(2) automatically extends the provisions of a lapsed 
agreement until a new agreement is signed or a work 
stoppage occurs. 
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Section 8 acknowledges the desirability of shop stewards. 
Section 9 (1) The two central organisations will promote co- 
operation between the organisations and work for 
peaceful and stable working conditions . . . through 
joint industrial committees. .... 
(2) Collective agreements should aim at wage systems 
which will promote productivity. ... 
(3) No party may prevent a worker from doing as much 
and as good work as his abilities and his training 
permits. 
Section 10 commits breaches of this agreement or of collective 
agreements to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court 4 
subject to prior consultation between the parties. 
Section 11 provides that this agreement continues to bind 
affiliates of the two central organisations not- 
withstanding their withdrawal from membership. 
It is important to note that for over sixty years this Agreement 
has been virtually the only substantive " law " in the field of 
labour relations; that this " law " has been self-imposed, by agree- 
ment not legislation; and that the enforcement of the rules has been 
entrusted to the Labour Court, an essentially private tribunal 
(albeit one with statutory warrant). 
With the Basic Agreement as a framework, the functioning of 
the system can best be understood by a brief description of the two 
central organisations, the process of collective bargaining, and the 
network of tribunals erected by the parties to administer the 
system. 
THE CENTRAL ORGANISATIONS 
A. The Danish Employers' Confederation 
Employer organisation in Denmark has no counterpart in North 
America. The Danish Employers' Confederation (" D.A.") 
embraces approximately 18,000 employers who employ approxi- 
mately 50 per cent. of the work force (including agriculture). Most 
firms not affiliated to the D.A., either directly or through a trade 
association, are organised into independent trade associations. 
The D.A. carries on an extensive and intensive management 
training programme at both the supervisory and executive level,5 
a statistical and research operation, as well as public relations and 
legislative activities in the general interests of its members. Its 
primary function, however, is the conduct of industrial relations, 
4 Properly called the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 5 Including two schools which run on a more or less full-time basis offering 
excellent seminars of varying lengths on a variety of topics. 
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two of its constitutional objects being " to contribute towards the 
avoidance as far as possible of disputes between employers and 
workers or to seek their solution by peaceful means without work 
stoppages," and " to contribute towards the maintenance of a 
spirit of solidarity and a common approach on the part of 
employers' organisations so as to protect employers' common 
interests in all questions concerning wages and working conditions " 
(section 2). 
The effective achievement of these objectives requires a delega- 
tion by individual employers to their association of substantial 
authority in matters relating to industrial relations. That this has 
been accomplished has been attributed 6 to a variety of factors: 
a tradition of organisation under the Guilds (some of which were 
actually transformed into employers' associations); the small unit 
size of many employers requiring organisation for self-protection; 
the absence of any extreme competitive spirit because of a limited 
domestic market; and a small and stable community structure. 
The D.A. is primarily a federation of trade associations, with 
provision being made for membership by individual firms ineligible 
to join any trade association. Its government is hierarchical, with 
a large general assembly (600 members), a central committee of 
fifty-four, and an executive committee of fifteen. As might be 
expected, the latter is the effective policy-maker. Day-to-day affairs 
are conducted by a substantial secretariat whose knowledge and 
professional skills in all matters relating to the D.A.'s programme 
are impressive. The attitude of the professional labour relations 
personnel towards labour leaders with whom they are in constant 
contact is, in my opinion, a major factor in the Danish success. 
Certainly it is radically different from the typical North American 
attitude and is in advance, as well, of the attitude of many indi- 
vidual Danish employers. As Galenson notes: " The chief work 
of the secretariat is the amicable adjustment of labour disputes; 
it is the executive committee and the higher representative bodies 
that are called upon to conduct industrial warfare." 7 This devo- 
tion to " amicable adjustment " seems to stem not merely from 
a respect and understanding based upon constant personal 
involvement. It is rather a considered professional judgment, 
unclouded by that personal financial or psychological commitment 
to the outcome of the particular dispute, which an employer 
inevitably has. 
The constitution of the D.A. forbids affiliates (without the 
consent of the executive committee) to bargain over wages and 
6 See Galenson, op. cit., c. 5. 
7 At p. 81. 
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working conditions, or to enter into collective agreements. The 
D.A. itself conducts negotiations on behalf of its affiliates and 
" recommends " wage policies to which they inevitably adhere." 
D.A. affiliates are required to attempt to settle disputes with their 
union counterpart but, failing settlement, carriage of the matter 
passes to the D.A. which has exclusive authority to deal with the 
L.O. 
The imposition of economic sanctions against trade unions is 
also regulated by the D.A. which, in its early years, followed a 
rather aggressive policy. Lockouts (a phenomenon not unknown in 
Denmark) must be authorised by the unanimous vote of the execu- 
tive committee or a three-quarters vote of the central committee, 
upon application by one of the D.A. affiliates. All member 
employers are required to obey a lockout order, subject to their 
right to apply for individual exemption in special cases. Employers 
not involved directly in a work stoppage are required to abstain 
from profiting by accepting work that would have been performed 
by the employers engaged in the dispute, and from employing 
striking or locked-out workers. The D.A. has power to order its 
members to boycott non-member employers who act contrary to 
the interests of members involved in a stoppage. 
All of these provisions are enforceable by fine (imposed by the 
D.A. Arbitration Board) and-ultimately-by expulsion. The D.A. 
maintains a special " Industrial Relief Fund," financed by an 
0-25 per cent. payroll levy, from which benefits are paid to 
employers engaged in work stoppages. 
The D.A. also provides representation for its members before 
the various labour tribunals, provides bargaining data and negotia- 
tors, and protects the interests of its members against " unfair " 
wage competition by non-members. 
The D.A.'s extensive activities are financed by compulsory 
contributions calculated as a percentage of the payroll of each 
member. The right of members to resign is stringently circum- 
scribed (except where a business is sold or wound up) and neither 
resignation nor expulsion releases a member from his existing 
obligations. Structurally, the D.A. is thus designed to withstand 
internal pressures from dissident members against centrally- 
formulated policies. In sum, the organisation is a complete, 
effective labour relations agency armed with the human and 
material resources to protect the interests of its members. 
8 While couched in terms of a " recommendation," D.A. wage policy is binding 
upon all affiliates. D.A. Constitution, s. 27d. 
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B. The Danish Federation of Trade Unions 
The Danish Federation of Trade Unions (the " L.O.") repre- 
sents approximately 97 per cent. of all organised workers, 60 per 
cent. of the total work force (including agriculture) and 90 per cent. 
of those persons employed in manufacturing, construction, trans- 
portation, and communications. As the basis of an understanding 
of its internal organisation, it must be noted that one union (the 
Labourers' Union) comprises approximately 50 per cent. of the 
total membership, while the smallest affiliates (comprising 40 per 
cent. of the total number of affiliates) account for only 4 per cent. 
of the total membership. Without detailing the development of 
the present structure,9 strong centrifugal forces are obviously to 
be expected. Complicating the situation are the multiplicity of 
small unions organised primarily on craft lines. 
The L.O. generally offers to its affiliates public relations and 
legislative representation, adult education and union leadership 
training, and statistical research. In addition, the L.O. has been 
active in politics through its affiliation with the Danish Social 
Democratic Party,o0 and has fostered a number of consumer 
co-operatives. 
Although each affiliated union nominally preserves sovereignty 
over its own affairs (including the execution of collective agree- 
ments) and is not bound by L.O. directives, the L.O. does exercise 
considerable influence over its affiliates. This influence can only be 
understood within the context of the Basic Agreement. Because 
that Agreement demands that the L.O. represent its affiliates in 
negotiations with the D.A., it has conferred upon the L.O. a 
position of prestige which enables it to co-ordinate and plot collec- 
tive bargaining strategy. This is customarily accomplished by an 
inter-union conference convened by the L.O. in advance of 
negotiations. 
Similarly, the Basic Agreement provides that the L.O. represent 
its affiliates before various tribunals and thus equips the L.O. with 
the power of moral suasion in the settlement of disputes which 
come before those tribunals. In regard to strikes and lockouts the 
L.O. may (but seldom does) withhold strike assistance if it disap- 
proves of a strike. Finally, the L.O. provides machinery for the 
adjudication of jurisdictional disputes.11 
9 See Galenson. c. 3. 
10 This " affiliation " takes the form of consultation, financial contribution, and 
representation in party councils. It does not involve formal membership on 
the fashion of the English Labour Party, or Canadian New Democratic 
Party. 
11 See infra. 
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Organisationally, the L.O. resembles the D.A. in several 
respects. Like the D.A., the L.O. receives a per capita levy from 
its affiliates; as in the D.A., the attitude of the L.O. professional 
staff 12 can only be characterised as enlightened. However, while 
the L.O. appears to enjoy a degree of authority over its affiliates 
far greater than that enjoyed by British 13 and North American 14 
labour federations, its authority falls short of that enjoyed by the 
D.A. Because the L.O.'s strength derives from the pressure of 
external forces-those generated by the Basic Agreement-rather 
than from a constitutional foundation, its ability to advocate and 
execute policy is often inhibited. 
RECOGNITION, THE DUTY TO BARGAIN, THE RIGHT TO ORGANISE 
The problem of employer recognition of unions and the refusal to 
bargain collectively which so vexed North American labour rela- 
tions prior to the passage of compulsory collective bargaining 
legislation-with its residue of mistrust and antagonism-has not 
been a significant problem in Denmark since 1899. The September 
Agreement of that year is an implicit acknowledgment by each 
party of the other's right to pursue its legitimate objectives and (in 
its present draft) expressly recognises the desirability of collective 
agreements and the rights of self-organisation. 
In the few recognition disputes which have occurred in recent 
decades (with unaffiliated employers) the use of economic pressure 
has been held lawful. Thus Danish labour, like British labour, has 
exhibited little interest in constructing an elaborate legal mechan- 
ism, on the North American model,'" to deal with the problem of 
recognition. Rather, it has been thought that a union too weak to 
compel recognition lacks the requisite bargaining power effectively 
to negotiate a collective agreement. 
The allied problem of employer interference with union member- 
ship was similarly solved by the September Agreement. From its 
12 Unlike the D.A., the L.O. does not employ a lawyer on its staff. 
13 Flanders and Clegg (eds.), The System of Industrial Relations in Great 
Britain (1960), p. 174 et seq. 
14 Goldberg, A.F.L.-C.I.O.: Labor United (1956). 
15 In both the United States and Canada an administrative agency (the " labour 
relations board ") is assigned the task of determining whether or not a 
particular union represents the majority of employees in an enterprise or some 
convenient portion thereof. Armed with the board's " certificate " of majority 
status, a union is entitled to require of the employer that he bargain with it. in good faith, with a view to concluding a collective agreement which will 
bind all employees. While an employer is free to recognise and deal with 
a union without resort to the " certification " procedure, in Canada, at least, 
the existence of the legal method of securing recognition from an employer 
displaces the union's right to assert economic pressure for the same end: 
Gagnon v. Foundation Maritime Ltd. [1961] S.C.R. 435. 
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inception the Labour Court regarded employer activity designed to 
discourage union membership as an attempt to derogate from the 
September Agreement by attempting the destruction of the other 
party. It is Galenson's thesis that: " [I]t was in removing the 
troublesome issue of the right to organise from the Danish labor 
arena that this unique document made its greatest contribution to 
industrial peace." 16 
It may be useful to speculate upon the reasons for the failure 
of American 17 and Canadian is legislation, protecting the right to 
organise, to bring to an end labour strife caused by the refusal of 
some employers to recognise unions or to allow their employees to 
participate in them. Might one reason be the feeling of North 
American employers that the right to organise, and the correspond- 
ing duty to recognise, unions was thrust upon them by an 
unfriendly legislature at the urging of a politically powerful labour 
lobby ? The attitude of the Danish employer, by contrast, is that 
he enjoys a proprietary interest in a system based upon a consensus 
(The Basic Agreement of 1899) to which he has voluntarily sub- 
scribed. As a " law-maker " the employer is thus psychologically 
committed to adherence to the law. 
THE CONCILIATION BOARD 
The major intrusion of the Government into the system erected by 
the parties has been in the area of conciliation. The Conciliation 
Act of 1910, originally passed, and since amended, on the basis of 
joint management-labour representations to Parliament, establishes 
a Conciliation Board. 
Three Conciliators are appointed by the Minister of Labour, on 
the recommendation of the Labour Court, for three-year terms, one 
retiring each year. They elect a chairman from among their 
number. Obviously, the Conciliators to be effective must enjoy the 
confidence of the parties, and the recently retired chairman of the 
Board, Mr. Erik Dreyer, held that position for approximately 
twenty-five years. In addition, a number of Mediators are 
appointed to assist the Conciliators, their tenure of office being 
identical. 
The Conciliation Board maintains surveillance of labour conflict 
by requiring the filing of all collective agreements, and of notices 
of any work stoppage. 
16 At p. 102. 
17 National Labor Relations Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, as amended. 
18 Collective Bargaining Act (Ont.), 1943; P.C. 1003 (Can.), 1944; Ontario 
Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 202. 
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If there is an actual or threatened work stoppage of " social 
importance " a Conciliator has power to convene the parties for 
discussion following unsuccessful direct negotiations. He is also 
empowered to assist the parties in negotiating new agreements even 
though they have not terminated their direct negotiations. Upon 
being summoned by the Conciliator, the parties are required to 
designate their representatives and to attend before him. 
As a condition of entering upon his duties, the Conciliator may 
require the parties to postpone a threatened work stoppage for a 
period not exceeding two weeks. In cases where the stoppage 
would affect " essential public institutions or services," is " of 
far-reaching social importance," or (though per se not important) 
would " be likely to prejudice decisively the possibilities of an 
amicable settlement of the dispute as a whole," a further two-week 
postponement may be imposed by the unanimous vote of the three 
Conciliators. In this special group of cases all three Conciliators 
may decide to intervene jointly. 
To assist the Conciliator in obtaining a factually accurate view 
of the situation, he may compel the parties to furnish him with 
statements. Of course, Conciliators are charged with a standing 
obligation to " keep themselves acquainted with the general situa- 
tion at the time as regards industrial conditions, and particularly 
wage conditions." Where, in the course of mediation, the Con- 
ciliator finds that matters of a technical nature have not been 
properly discussed by the parties, he may require them to resume 
direct negotiations and (subject to a time limit) may meanwhile 
adjourn the mediation proceedings. 
The effective operation of the Act is best seen in the context of 
a discussion of the mechanics of collective bargaining. It is 
characteristic that the legislation dovetails with the Standard Rules 
for Negotiation established by agreement between the L.O. and the 
D.A. 
THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS 
Collective agreements in Denmark are usually entered into by 
" sub-organisations " affiliated to the D.A. or the L.O. (e.g., 
between an employers' association representing all employers in 
the woodworking industry, and a group of unions representing 
(among them) the employees in that industry). Negotiations, how- 
ever, are carried out under the aegis of the central organisations 
and subject to the Standard Rules for Negotiation of Agreements 
established by them.19 By virtue of these rules, all collective 
agreements expire on March 1. This date is significant in that it 
11 See Appendix two, infra. 
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represents a compromise between union insistence upon a summer 
expiry date (timed to coincide with the period of high employment 
and high production levels) and employer insistence upon a winter 
expiry date (during the slack season). 
Given this uniform expiry date, it was possible for the parties 
to create, and to adhere to, a tight schedule of negotiations. 
The first move for a party desiring revision of an existing agree- 
ment is to deliver to the opposite party, prior to November 1, a 
list of proposed changes. Where no notice is given, the agreement 
remains in force. Negotiations then commence between the " sub- 
organisations," and continue until December 1, with or without 
the assistance of a Mediator. If the negotiations succeed, a new 
agreement is concluded; if they fail, the central organisations 
assume the onus at the next stage of negotiations. The " sub- 
organisations " report to the central organisation the progress of 
their negotiations, including those questions which have been 
settled and those still outstanding. 
All bargaining from December 1 forward looks towards the 
submission of proposed collective agreements to both parties for 
ratification. For purposes of the ratification vote all sub-organisa- 
tions are lumped together in eight occupational groups 20 which 
together embrace the entire work force. All results achieved at any 
stage in the bargaining after December 1 are incorporated in the 
proposed agreements later submitted for ratification. 
After December 1 the central organisations appoint six-man 
negotiating committees which meet forthwith and begin to bargain. 
Bargaining demands are classified as " general " and " non- 
general," the former being those " relevant to all or the majority 
of fields covered by agreements, such as demands relating to hours 
of work, changes in rates of wages, changes in rules governing . . . 
holidays . . . , social amenities, and questions about the duration of 
agreements." The central organisations conduct negotiations on 
matters so defined, and on other matters mutually conceded to be 
appropriate for centralised bargaining. The Conciliator may be 
invited to assist informally at this stage. 
These negotiations continue until December 20, at which time 
the Conciliation Board is advised officially of the state of the nego- 
tiations, and is invited to preside over the negotiations, with a view 
to their completion by January 20. During negotiations, the 
Conciliator may make proposals respecting concessions which would 
be conducive to amicable settlements. The dispute then enters the 
20 The eight are: metal trades; textile and clothing; food and drink; other 
industries, including woodworking; building and construction; transportation; 
graphic industries (including paper goods); office and commercial employees. 
I.C.L.Q.-12 9 
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mediation stage. The Conciliator, after consultation with the 
representatives of both parties, prepares a proposed collective agree- 
ment, embodying the terms thus far agreed upon, together with 
terms which he has reason to believe are likely to be mutually 
acceptable. 
While the central organisations are thus engaged in bargaining 
over 4 general " demands, the sub-organisations continue their 
negotiations over " non-general " demands under the supervision 
of the central organisations. If such negotiations are unsuccessful, 
the parties may remit outstanding issues to a Joint Committee or to 
the Conciliation Board. The Conciliation Board may commence 
to mediate the issues referred to it, or may also remit them to a 
Joint Committee. 
The Joint Committees comprise partisan representatives from 
each of the central organisations, from each of the parties to the 
agreement, and from the occupational group within whose frame- 
work ratification must take place. All issues are decided by the 
Joint Committee by majority vote, and, failing a majority, by an 
umpire. The issues committed to the Joint Committee, which 
frequently involve the consideration of local conditions, or piece- 
rate structures peculiar to particular trades, may be decided before 
or after the conclusion of new agreements. All " non-general " 
demands not so dealt with are negotiated under the aegis of a 
Mediator, and his proposals will then be included in the proposed 
collective agreements to be voted upon by the various occupational 
groups. 
The final step in the process is the submission by the Conciliator 
to the parties of a proposed collective agreement. In practice, 
where there is no hope that the parties will agree, the Conciliator 
usually withdraws. After consulting the parties as to the formal 
aspects of the proposed collective agreement, the Conciliator fixes 
a time within which they must accept or reject it. A ratification 
vote is then conducted by each of the parties by secret ballot which 
affords a simple negative or affirmative choice. The voting con- 
stituencies are the eight occupational groups, although there may 
be different agreements (with common " general " terms) before 
the various sub-organisations which comprise a particular 
occupational group. 
The Conciliation Act establishes complex voting rules intended 
to prevent distortion of the result should a vigorous minority vote 
and an indifferent majority abstain. Similarly, provision is made 
for giving proper weight to the result of votes taken at union 
meetings rather than by membership ballot, since the results of all 
votes throughout the entire occupational group are pooled and 
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ratification or rejection is binding on all sub-organisations embraced 
by the group. 
The actual mechanics of the collective bargaining process are, 
for a North American, irrelevant. What may be instructive is an 
attempt to distil the essential factors in the system which help to 
produce successful bargaining. Apart from the characteristic 
Danish r6gime of self-imposed law, there is an evident intertwining 
of the private and the public legal processes. The Conciliation Act 
is obviously tailor-made to fit the processes agreed to by the parties 
in the Standard Rules for Negotiation. At the same time, the 
Conciliator does not merely act as a conduit between the L.O. and 
the D.A. His ability to draft proposed collective agreements 
potentially enlists the prestige of the State on behalf of a particular 
settlement, and subjects the parties to the pressures of public 
opinion.21 This fact must be weighed against strong opposition 
from both labour and management to direct public intervention in 
the bargaining process, although the right of the Conciliator to 
postpone strikes " of far-reaching social importance " may repre- 
sent some retreat from purely private negotiations. Again, there 
have been some eighteen occasions in the past fifty years when Par- 
liament has chosen to legislate particular proposed agreements pre- 
pared by the Conciliator and rejected by one of the parties (usually 
management). Increasingly resorted to in recent years (most 
recently in 1961), parliamentary intervention may be inevitable 
where nation-wide bargaining has grave repercussions for the 
national economy.22 
Aside from ad hoc public intervention, the parties are free to 
make their own bargain. It is interesting to note that they have 
chosen to use the whole range of negotiating procedures from direct 
bargaining (initially); to conciliation (the Conciliator's role prior to 
his making a proposal); to arbitration (voluntarily, of non-general 
demands); to mediation (the proposed collective agreement 
advanced by the Conciliator). These procedures each are felt to be 
appropriate at the particular stage and in the particular circum- 
stances in which they are invoked. Each procedure is only invoked 
when its use is agreed to by the parties-even mediation, since the 
Conciliator will not submit a proposed agreement for ratification 
21 On the other hand, the statements made in conciliation proceedings may not 
be published (except with consent of both parties) and the proposed agreement 
is not published until it has been accepted or rejected. Thus, the extent to 
which public opinion can be mobilised is limited. 
22 The so-called " Radical " (Centre) Party has from time to time advocated 
compulsory arbitration of negotiation disputes. The predominant Social 
Democratic Party, the D.A. and the L.O. have always hitherto resolutely 
opposed " government intervention " in the bargaining process, although the 
idea once again is enjoying some currency. 
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when one of the parties indicates strong opposition. Contrast this 
diversity of techniques with the North American practice which 
generally involves only two: direct bargaining (compulsory in both 
Canada and the United States), and conciliation (compulsory in 
Canada, voluntary in the United States). No doubt mediation and 
arbitration are distasteful to Canadian labour and management as 
general propositions, but their selective use under special 
circumstances by private arrangement ought to be examined.23 
Thirdly, the Danish process is geared to industry-wide 
determination of labour standards. Obviously, this avoids ruinous 
competition based on wage-cutting that has characterised labour 
strife, at least in some Canadian industries.24 This creates the 
problem of adjusting general standards to particular circumstances 
which the Danes have solved by the stratification of negotiations 
between the central and sub-organisations, on the basis of general 
and non-general demands. Similarly, centralised negotiations 
generate pressures for disputes to be confined to major issues with 
the resultant willingness to sacrifice smaller interests for the general 
good when settlements are in the balance. This tends to leave 
pockets of dissatisfaction which may lead to illegal localised strife. 
On the other hand, centralised bargaining does make it possible 
for the strong to help the weak by gaining bargaining demands on 
an industry-wide basis that could never be accomplished by 
individual participants. 
Finally, the Danes have constructed a rigid time table of 
negotiations. The uniform expiry date of agreements prevents the 
" escalator " effect of successive bargaining demands. The pro- 
gression of negotiations automatically from one stage to the next 
on predetermined dates means that the parties are unable to abuse 
the legally established process by delays calculated to obtain 
strategic advantages. (This particular characteristic of the 
Canadian conciliation process has received considerable adverse 
criticism.25) Both parties know that agreements must be 
denounced by February 14, that the agreements expire on March 1, 
and that a strike or lockout may then occur, subject only to the 
Conciliator's limited powers to postpone the stoppage. The Basic 
23 The Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 202, s. 14, provides that 
the parties may, by agreement, submit their differences to mediation rather 
than conciliation. 
24 Most notably, perhaps, the residential construction industry in Metropolitan 
Toronto. See, e.g., Report of the Royal Commission on Labour-Management 
Relations in the Construction Industry (Ontario, 1962); cf. Carpenter, 
Employers' Associations and Collective Bargaining in New York City (1950), 
pp. 373-374. 
25 Woods, " Canadian Collective Bargaining and Disputes Settlement Policy: 
An Appraisal " (1955) 21 C.J.E. P.S. 447. 
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Agreement provides that collective agreements remain in force, 
although denounced, until a work stoppage occurs or new agree- 
ments are executed. This fills a hiatus which would otherwise 
exist when, after the expiry of a collective agreement, employees 
apparently revert to the common law master-servant relationship. 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT 
The Basic Agreement provides: 
" When a collective agreement has been concluded, and for its 
duration, no stoppage of work (strike, blockade, lockout, or 
boycott) may be effected within the scope of the agreement 
unless warranted by the ' Standard Rules for the Settlement of 
Labour Disputes ' or by existing collective agreements. 
Sympathetic strikes or sympathetic lockouts may, however, be 
effected in accordance with current agreements and legal 
practice." [Section 2 (1).] 
This provision is a reflection of a dichotomy drawn in Danish 
labour law between " interest " disputes and " legal " disputes. 
Interest disputes arise during negotiations, are governed by the 
Rules for Negotiation of Agreements above referred to, and contem- 
plate resort to economic self-help. Legal disputes involve rights 
arising from the Basic Agreement or from a collective agreement. 
The process of settlement is prescribed by the Standard Rules for 
the Settlement of Labour Disputes, by the Basic Agreement, and by 
the Labour Court Act. Adjudication of legal disputes is committed 
to the Labour Court where a breach of a collective agreement or the 
Basic Agreement is alleged, or to Industrial Arbitration where the 
question is one of interpretation. As indicated by section 2 (1) of 
the Basic Agreement, work stoppages in legal disputes are only 
permitted in the circumstances set forth in the Standard Rules for 
Settlement of Labour Disputes. The obvious difficulty of drawing 
a line between interest disputes and legal disputes is best illustrated 
by controversies arising during the currency of a collective agree- 
ment about matters not expressly provided for therein, e.g., wage 
rates for new types of work. Such disputes are generally regarded 
as interest disputes, and the right to strike exists unless expressly 
waived by agreement.26 By contrast the British reluctance to 
categorise disputes as " interest " disputes or " legal " disputes 
2G Galenson, p. 244. The American position is similar. By contrast, under 
Canadian legislation all strikes during the currency of an agreement are 
illegal, although arbitration is only available for questions involving the 
interpretation, application, administration or violation of an agreement. 
There is no method for adjusting interest disputes during an agreement. 
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has precluded the establishment of a system of tribunals to adjudi- 
cate at least the latter type. Economic sanctions (or the threat 
thereof) are thus frequently employed to ensure adherence to 
collective bargaining obligations.27 
The " Standard Rules for the Settlement of Labour Disputes " 
were adopted in 1908 by the L.O. and the D.A., and since 1934 
have been part of every collective agreement which does not specify 
some other adequate provision for Industrial Arbitration.28 By 
section 1, the parties " agree to try to settle any trade disputes by 
mediation, or, if necessary, by arbitration." Disputes are commit- 
ted in the first instance to a Mediation Committee, and, failing 
settlement, to negotiations between the two central organisations. 
If the dispute involves " the interpretation of an existing price- 
list with general conditions or a general [collective] agreement " 
between the parties, either party may refer it to arbitration; in 
these cases there is no right to engage in work stoppage. In all 
other cases mediation must precede a work stoppage, subject to 
three exceptions: 
(a) both parties may agree to arbitration; 
(b) in cases involving " a suspension of payment " or if " the 
regard for life, welfare or honour affords compelling 
reasons," there may be a work-stoppage before mediation; 
(c) the Rules are without prejudice to the right to engage in a 
sympathetic work stoppage ordered by the two central 
organisations. 
The issue of " arbitrability," which turns on the existence of an 
agreement, is left to the Labour Court. The Rules provide for the 
selection of an ad hoc, tripartite, board of arbitration, familiar in 
Canada, where arbitration of such disputes is compulsory, and in 
the United States where, though voluntary, arbitration is almost 
universal. 
There exists, in addition to the ad hoc boards of arbitration, a 
permanent arbitral tribunal known as the Contract Board of 1939, 
established in that year by agreement between the L.O. and the 
D.A. The Board readjusts, semi-annually, the cost-of-living supple- 
ment which has been enjoyed by Danish workers since the 1930s. 
One of its most important functions, however, is to hear and deter- 
mine questions arising out of the interpretation of the proposed 
collective agreement prepared by the Conciliator, should the parties 
27 Kahn-Freund, " Labour Law," in Law and Opinion in England (1959), at 
p. 232 et seq. 
28 Cf. Ontario Labour Relations Act, s. 34 (2), which also provides a standard- 
form arbitration clause in the event that the parties have failed to include 
such a clause in their agreement. 
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be unable, by negotiation, to agree upon an interpretation. Since 
the Contract Board is charged with the duty of ascertaining the 
" intent of the parties " in agreeing to the Conciliator's proposal, 
it is perhaps natural that the members of the Board should be the 
chief D.A. negotiator, his L.O. counterpart, and the Conciliator. 
There is no real distinction between those matters decided by the 
Contract Board of 1939 and those decided by arbitration, save that 
the former were usually " general " questions at the negotiation 
stage, while the latter were " non-general " or local issues, peculiar 
to particular trades or enterprises. Frequently, too, matters which 
involve technical knowledge of the industry and its practices are 
decided by arbitration. 
Several problems which form the hard core of contract adjudica- 
tion in North America are without counterpart in Denmark. The 
most important of these are seniority and unjust discharge. The 
absence of disputes on these two issues is easily explained by the 
broad management rights clause [section 4 (1)] in the Basic Agree- 
ment, acknowledging the " employers' right to direct and distribute 
work and to use what labour may in their judgment be suitable," 
subject only to exercise in a " responsible manner " and to vested 
rights under collective agreements. 
There has been no significant union pressure for a seniority 
system (to confer a preference in promotion, in lay-offs, and in 
rehiring upon senior employees) such as that which North American 
unionists prize so highly. On the one hand, employers tend to 
exhibit loyalty to the older worker, partially because he is more 
skilled, productive and stable, partially because of the more inti- 
mate relationships in the smaller-scale Danish enterprises. On the 
other hand, Denmark's comprehensive and advanced scheme of 
welfare services (coupled, recently, with full employment) mitigate 
the harsh consequences of the loss of a job. 
The treatment of the unjustly discharged employee is a unique 
illustration of the Danish attitude towards labour relations. Until 
1960 there was no " due process of law " for the discharged 
employee. The occasional irresponsible acts of individual employers 
in discharging employees without cause tended to provoke retalia- 
tory wildcat strikes (which were, of course, illegal). In revising 
the Basic Agreement in November 1960 the D.A. agreed to a 
restriction on the broad management rights clause by the insertion 
of a proviso that " the right to dismiss individual workers . . . not 
be exercised in an arbitrary manner " [section 4 (3)]. A procedure 
for local (and then central) negotiations in the case of alleged unjust 
dismissals was established, culminating in adjudication by a per- 
manent, tripartite Board. The Board is empowered to compensate, 
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but not to reinstate, the unjustly discharged employee, the unions 
having acknowledged that the continued presence of the discharged 
employee in the plant would constitute an ongoing challenge to the 
authority of the employer.29 
Thus both sides have realised that unfettered employer discre- 
tion may create industrial friction, and by contract have agreed to 
a moderate restatement of that discretion, neither side pressing for 
complete control. 
In one area of collective agreement administration-displace- 
ment caused by technological change-the Danes have since 1947 
faced up to a problem which awaits institutional recognition by 
North American labour. The basic commitment of both parties 
to increased productivity and efficiency flows from section 9 of the 
Basic Agreement. In 1947, the L.O. and the D.A. agreed to estab- 
lish in each enterprise a joint Works Committee, representing both 
labour and management whose functions are defined as follows 
[section 5] : 
(a) With a view to furthering production the committee 
shall deal with all matters relating to rational operation, 
including such questions as the technical equipment, the plan- 
ning of the work, economy as regards materials, etc., the aim 
being organisation of the working process so as to increase the 
productivity to the widest possible extent in order to reduce 
the cost of production, to bring about lower prices, and to 
benefit the undertaking, the persons employed in the under- 
taking and the community as a whole. 
The committee shall also promote the vocational training 
within the undertaking. 
(b) For the purpose of creating the best possible conditions 
of work, thus promoting job-complacency, the committee shall 
deal with questions of welfare, safety, health, employment 
security, etc. 
If reductions or reorganisation of the working of the under- 
taking are contemplated, the committee shall as early as pos- 
sible deal with the matter in order to make the change as easy 
as possible for the workers concerned. 
(c) In order to encourage the workers' interest in the opera- 
tion of the undertaking it shall be the duty of the employer 
to provide the committee with such information about the 
economic conditions of the undertaking and its position within 
the trade as is of importance for the conditions of production 
29 Most North American arbitrators take the view that their jurisdiction extends 
so far as to enable them to order the reinstatement in employment of an 
unjustly discharged employee. 
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and the possibilities of sale in general. Information about the 
accounts shall be given to the same extent as is normally given 
to shareholders through the accounts submitted at the annual 
general meeting of the company. There shall be no obligation 
to supply information that may be used to the detriment of the 
undertaking, or information about personal matters. 
The Committee has no power to affect in any way the negotia- 
tion, interpretation, or termination of collective agreements, and 
acts entirely by consultation and negotiation. Meetings are held 
after working hours, but the employer pays the employees an hourly 
rate for attendance. The Committee is empowered to obtain all 
relevant information, including confidential management communi- 
cations, which might affect the company's competitive and collec- 
tive bargaining position were the Committee members not sworn to 
secrecy. 
The technique of the most successful Works Committees has 
been to prevent dislocation where possible, by means of a transition 
period during which redundant employees can be relocated either 
within or outside the enterprise. At the same time, employee sup- 
port for innovations is secured by inviting employee suggestions 
and by making employees feel that they are part of the decision- 
making process. Unfortunately, the Works Committee system has 
not met with universal favour amongst either employers or 
unionists, despite an active educational campaign by both central 
organisations. To date, a high level of employment has meant that 
technologically displaced workers could be easily employed else- 
where, and the system has remained relatively untested. 
THE LABOUR COURT 
At the centre of the network of specialised tribunals which deals 
with legal disputes is the Labour Court. It was conceived in the 
provisions of the September Agreement of 1899 as a private Court 
of Arbitration, and re-established on its present statutory base in 
1910 at the joint request of the L.O. and D.A. The Court is com- 
posed of six regular partisan members and sixteen deputies (of 
whom half are nominees of the L.O. and half of the D.A.), appoin- 
ted for two-year terms. A neutral president and three vice- 
presidents are elected annually by the partisan members and 
(together with at least one regular and two deputy members from 
each side) must possess the legal qualifications for judicial appoint- 
ment. Indeed, the neutral members of the Court are inevitably 
drawn from the judiciary, who are statutorily bound to accept 
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appointment."3 The requirement that the partisan members elect 
the neutrals annually is in deliberate contrast to the general Danish 
tradition of life tenure for judges. It is premised on the belief that 
the annual election assures a moral commitment of the parties to 
the decisions of their neutral arbiters. In fact only once has a 
neutral failed of re-election because one of the central organisations 
chose to wreak vengeance for an adverse decision.31 
The jurisdiction of the Court is set* forth in section 4 of the Act, 
and parallels the commitments to the Court's jurisdiction contained 
in the various private arrangements made by the parties. The 
Court may adjudicate: 
(1) breaches of the Basic Agreement, 
(2) breaches of any agreement between a union and an em- 
ployers' association or an individual (unaffiliated) employer, 
except in so far as the parties may by agreement specifically 
oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, 
(3) the legality of any work stoppage, or the adequacy of the 
notice thereof (including stoppages in violation of existing 
agreements, or of arbitration awards, or of awards of the 
Labour Court), and 
(4) on consent, other matters of dispute between employers and 
workers provided it is founded upon some contractual 
arrangement. 
Proceedings are nominally instituted by or against the central 
organisation (if any) to which the plaintiff or defendant belongs. 
However, a central organisation will only assume legal liability 
where it has been party to the offence or where it has contracted 
to do so. Individual unaffiliated employers may sue and defend 
in their own right, but the individual unorganised worker has no 
status before the Court and must resort to his common law remedies 
in the regular courts. 
The statistics 32 of the Court's operations reveal the effect of the 
pre-eminent position of the L.O. and D.A. Approximately two- 
thirds of all cases were brought by the L.O. as plaintiff. Of the 
one-third of employer-plaintiff cases, the D.A. brought about 80 
per cent. (although it represents a much lower percentage of 
employers), the balance being brought by unaffiliated employers. 
30 In an interesting contrast to a current Canadian controversy over a proposal 
to remove county court judges from labour arbitration, the Labour Court Act 
directs that if a judge's Labour Court duties interfere with his regular duties, 
he is to be relieved of the latter, not the former. 
31s Galenson, p. 212. The Labour Court Act provides for appointment of the 
neutrals by the Chief Justice of the Copenhagen courts, and his colleagues, 
in the event that the partisan members are unable to agree. 
32 See Galenson, c. 10. 
JAN. 1963] Labour Lore and Labour Law 267 
Generally speaking, the employer as plaintiff is more often success- 
ful than the union as plaintiff. From these facts, several 
conclusions may be drawn: the L.O. has commenced many cases 
because it is " politically " unable to refuse its affiliates, with the 
consequent likelihood of a larger proportion of weak cases; most of 
the D.A. cases are subject to a filtering by D.A. staff lawyers, and 
are more likely to have merit; many of the union-plaintiff cases 
involve the policing of agreements with unaffiliated employers, as 
appears from the fact that the D.A. is party to barely one-half of 
the cases before the Court. In sum it does seem clear that, within 
their constitutional limitations, the central organisations control the 
Court's business, keep the volume of business within manageable 
limits, and tend to avoid weak and unimportant cases. 
The Labour Court's procedures also tend to channel its energies 
towards the decision of important and difficult cases. Cases are 
initiated by complaint, notice is given to the respondent, and the 
matter set down for preliminary hearing before the president. The 
purpose of this hearing is " to facilitate mediation between the 
parties or ... to obtain further information . .. by way of prepara- 
tion for the hearing." Some 20 per cent. of all cases are withdrawn 
before the preliminary hearing, 45 per cent. are withdrawn after- 
wards, and only approximately 35 per cent. result in a final 
judgment.33 The form of the preliminary hearing obviously con- 
duces to settlement. The hearing (usually held on Friday after- 
noon) is conducted in the presence of the president, the parties and 
counsel. No witnesses are called, but the parties each state their 
position. The president then " explains " the law to the parties 
and may make it clear to them that the matter ought not to be 
pursued. This device is especially desirable for the L.O. as it 
provides a ground upon which a hopeless case, prosecuted because 
of internal " political " pressures, can be dropped. The informality 
of the hearing also enables the parties to " let off steam," after 
which they may be content to terminate the matter. 
Failing settlement, the case comes on for formal hearing the 
next morning. Proceedings are held in camera, the parties are 
represented by counsel34 and may, of course, call evidence. 
Immediately after the hearing, without any preliminary caucuses, 
the partisan judges are polled (plaintiff first) and the presiding 
33 The figures are taken from Galenson, supra, note 32. D.A. statistics indicate 
that only some 20 per cent. of their recent cases result in final judgment, the 
balance being withdrawn either before or after the preliminary hearing. 34 The L.O. does not employ legally-trained counsel, although their representative 
is apparently intelligent and vigorous. This traditional labour suspicion of 
lawyers may be somewhat obsolescent, as the Vice-President of the L.O., in 
his 1961 birthday speech, stated his " birthday wish " to be the recruiting for 
L.O. service of more professional people, including lawyers. 
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judge votes last. He will then prepare a draft judgment which will 
be discussed at a later meeting of the Court, and will ultimately be 
delivered to the parties as the unanimous decision of the Court. 
The partisan judges are thus able to assist the neutrals by frank 
discussion in conference, but do not derogate from the authority 
of their decision by refusing to subscribe to it. 
Cases may be withdrawn at any time before final judgment, a 
consideration of importance to a party faced with the likely pros- 
pect of creating an adverse precedent. The Court of its own motion 
may remit any appropriate case to arbitration (especially where 
some technical, factual question is involved) or to the Contract 
Board of 1939, with or without reserving to itself power of final 
disposition. In its judgment, the Court usually awards costs against 
the losing party, although in close cases the costs may be evenly 
divided. Subject to these considerations, it delivers judgment in 
the familiar fashion of any Court. 
What is unique, however, is the remedy employed. Aside from 
its power to order the payment of money where failure to pay is the 
basis of the proceeding, the primary remedy is the fine. The 
measure of the fine is determined both by penal and compensatory 
considerations, as the fine is paid over to the aggrieved party. 
Thus the Court considers the actual loss incurred, the existence of 
aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and the seriousness of 
the offence. Aggravating circumstances may include a refusal to 
submit to arbitration, or to obey an award of the Court or of an 
arbitration board. Extenuating circumstances usually involve 
some provocative or unjust act of the plaintiff, and the bona fides 
of the defendant. The discretionary fine was originally adopted at 
the suggestion of the unions, and has proved to be an effective 
device for enforcing adherence to legal obligations. Not the least 
reason for its effectiveness is the fact that it is inevitably collected. 
Fines awarded against unions 35 or employers are levied upon in the 
same manner as any legal judgment. Fines awarded against 
individual employees (usually for striking illegally) are calculated 
in terms of ability to pay, and then are withheld from the 
employee's salary. If he should change jobs, his new employer is 
required to make the deduction; if he becomes unemployed, his 
assets are seized in satisfaction. The employer is forbidden to 
forgive the fine as a technique of buying peace, and the D.A. polices 
its own members strictly to ensure that all fines are collected. 
One substantive problem which has given the Court difficulty is 
the vicarious liability of a union for the acts of its members. In 
35 A local union may be put into bankruptcy, and its successor nonetheless 
continues to be liable for the fine. 
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the case of illegal strikes, any form of union endorsation will invoke 
liability, as will a failure to take all possible steps to end the strike 
(including withholding strike pay, and assisting the employer in 
finding replacements). On the other hand, liability will almost 
always fall upon the local union with its limited assets, rather than 
upon the national. 
The remedy employed by the Labour Court, like so much of 
Danish labour law, represents a quid pro quo: in return for an 
effective remedy for employers the unions obtain a cheap, quick and 
expert forum in which they may pursue their legal rights. The 
parties are obviously satisfied with the operation of the Labour Court 
which is, after all, a tribunal of their own making. Section 5B 
(1) of the Labour Court Act provides: " where there exists a right 
to take proceedings before the Labour Court proceedings before an 
ordinary court of law are prohibited. .. ." Neither the L.O. nor 
the D.A. have attempted to challenge the jurisdiction of the Labour 
Court, despite the existence in Danish law of procedures analogous 
to the prerogative writ procedures in the common law. Even 
Labour Court decisions defining its own jurisdiction have gone 
unchallenged. In questioning the parties on this point, I received 
the answer: " Why should we, for the sake of a victory in a 
particular case, seek to destroy a useful and important institution 
which we have built ourselves ? " This forbearance from the full 
use of all legal weapons is in sharp contrast to the common North 
American attitude that every proceeding is a tactical manoeuvre 
designed not merely to protect legal rights, but to bludgeon the 
opposite party into submission. The Danish attitude is demon- 
strated in many ways: a reluctance to frame proceedings in 
common law terms so as to invoke the strict tort doctrines 
employed by the regular courts; the refusal of the D.A. to support 
actions by individual anti-union workmen; above all, a willingness 
to accept legal defeat as " fortunes of war." The net effect is that 
virtually the whole body of Danish labour law is found in the 
decisions of the Labour Court and that the Court's prestige stands 
high amongst management and labour, professionals and laymen, 
alike. 
The only current criticism of the Court, one which ought not 
permanently to impair its prestige, stems from its increasing pre- 
occupation with illegal strikes. In the past few years, largely 
because of a general inflationary trend, there have been several 
instances of local " wildcat " strikes. This fact coupled with 
increased employer adherence to legal obligations and a firm Court 
policy of remitting cases to arbitration where possible has meant 
that a disproportionately high number of the Court's decisions in 
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recent years have involved fines for illegal strikers. Whether this 
trend will lead workers to adopt an image of the Court as an 
oppressor remains to be seen. 
There does not appear to be extensive criticism indicating a 
trend towards excessive " legalism " in the Court's decision- 
making. The requirement that the neutrals and some of the 
partisan members possess legal qualifications is counter-balanced by 
the practice of the Court in so constituting the hearing panel as to 
include partisan members with knowledge of the industry involved. 
Decisions of the Court are generally handed down within two weeks 
after hearing, seldom more than three months, and in crisis situa- 
tions (such as illegal strikes) within a day or two. The Court 
conducts its hearing with a minimum of formalism, and the role 
of the judge is more active than is customary in our tradition. 
Precedent has persuasive weight, and the citation of decided cases 
might be thought to favour trained D.A. lawyers over untrained 
L.O. representatives. But although labour from time to time has 
vaguely suggested that the Court ought not to dispense " law " 
but " justice," the current L.O. representative (not himself a 
lawyer) seemed quite prepared to pursue the present practice of 
reliance upon decided cases. 
THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF INDUSTRIAL WARFARE 
The regular courts, as well as the parties, have chosen to regard the 
jurisdiction of the Labour Court as exclusive. Thus, cases with a 
" double aspect " involving a breach of an agreement coming 
within the Labour Court's jurisdiction, as well as violation of a 
common law right, have been remitted to the Labour Court. The 
cases in which the regular courts have been free to develop their 
jurisprudence have been few in recent years, and largely confined 
to actions by unorganised workers or unaffiliated employers against 
unions. 
Employers in Denmark have traditionally refrained from wide- 
spread use of the blacklist, the " yellow-dog " contract or the 
" document " (as it is known in Britain), and of strikebreakers, at 
least since the September Agreement of 1899. All of these tactics 
are particularly adaptable for " union-busting " campaigns which 
are not within the ethos of Danish labour relations. On the other 
hand, the lockout (both primary and sympathetic) is a recognised 
bargaining device employed to prevent unions from breaking a wage 
standard by concentrating pressure on weak employers. Occasion- 
ally the lockout does set off a chain-reaction of strike-counter 
lockout-counter strike with the result that minor disputes achieve 
major proportions. The propriety of economic strikes and lockouts 
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has been largely determined by the Basic Agreement, and breaches 
are not litigated in the regular courts. 
Picketing is usually unnecessary, since the mere announcement 
of a strike in the press usually suffices to bring out the work force. 
Information on picketing designed to advise workers of a dispute is 
lawful, but that which is intended to procure a customer boycott 
is unlawful on the theory that the employer's public reputation is 
permanently damaged. On the same theory, publication of the 
names of workers who refuse to cease work is forbidden. Danish 
law recognises a cause of action for the deliberate interference with 
the rights of another, which is occasionally employed where the 
union was held to be seeking some improper objective, not related 
to its normal interests. Organisational strikes are lawful, but (at 
least in those enterprises affiliated with the D.A.) pressure to compel 
the closed or union shop is unlawful. There is some case law 
forbidding union pressure on the employer to discharge non-union 
employees, but this objective is usually achieved by social ostracism 
rather than by resort to economic force. In the case of employers 
not affiliated with the D.A., the closed shop is a lawful labour 
objective, but unions are compelled to allow non-members to join. 
Consumer boycotts of employers engaged in a labour dispute have 
been held to be an unlawful attempt to broaden the range of 
economic sanctions. 
One can only conclude that the Danish common law doctrines 
are not dissimilar to our own, but that they are seldom invoked 
because the parties, realising the inherent limitations of the ordinary 
judicial processes, have chosen instead self-made and self- 
administered regulation. This approach to the legal regulation of 
economic warfare stems from a position not unlike that which 
Professor Kahn-Freund describes as characteristic of British indus- 
trial relations-" collective laissez-faire." 36 Concurred in by the 
legislature and the courts, it has resulted in an atmosphere of willing 
acceptance which legislative compulsion has precluded in the United 
States, and in the consistent and expert analysis of legal problems 
which is impossible in Canada where common law tort doctrines 
survive anachronistically in an era of compulsory collective 
bargaining. 
Jurisdictional inter-union disputes 37 are settled intramurally by 
the L.O., the D.A. having early declined to participate in joint pro- 
cedures for several reasons: an unwillingness to shoulder a thank- 
less task; a refusal to allow, by implication, monopolistic craft 
claims; a fear of inhibiting new patterns of industrial development. 
36 See Kahn-Freund, op. cit., supra, note 27 at p. 224. 
:37 See Galenson, p. 63 et seq. 
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Surprisingly, jurisdictional disputes have not proved to be as much 
of a problem in Denmark as a North American might anticipate, 
keeping in mind the number of small, entrenched craft unions 
whose patterns of organisation antedate industrialisation. The 
L.O.'s jurisdictional dispute procedures follow the usual Danish 
pattern of private consultation between the rival parties, followed 
by an attempt at third-party conciliation, and culminating in 
private, tri-partite adjudication. The L.O.'s jurisdictional disputes 
tribunal is composed of two L.O. nominees, a nominee of each of 
the rival unions, and a chairman (who is a judge). Adjudication 
is seldom invoked today, however, because of the success of the 
system in establishing lines of demarcation in the past, and in 
achieving agreement between the parties. The tribunal, as a 
matter of substantive law, relies heavily upon established practices 
and its own precedents, allowing for the desires of employees, 
comparative wage rates, and the status quo, in marginal cases. 
The significant fact to be noted is, however, the substitution in 
Denmark of private legal processes for economic self-help, or public 
adjudication.38 
LAW REFORM 
Since 1908, the Danes have engaged in continual review and 
refinement of both their public and private legal arrangements in 
matters relating to labour relations. 
The current law reform agency is the Labour Law Commission 
whose membership comprises representatives of the L.O., the D.A., 
of other employee and employer groups, the president of the Labour 
Court, the Chairman of the Conciliation Agency, representatives of 
the Ministry of Labour, and members of parliament representing 
the major parties. The reforms implemented in 1957-60 as a result 
of the work of the Commission involved revision of the September 
Agreement of 1899, the Standard Rules for Negotiation of Collective 
Agreements, and the Conciliation Act. 
Once again, the mixed private and public nature of the Danish 
system becomes apparent, with primary emphasis focused on the 
consensus of the L.O. and D.A. as a condition precedent to 
lawmaking. 
North American legislators might be well advised to consider 
38 The Ontario Labour Relations Act, s. 66, represents a pioneering effort in 
public adjudication of jurisdictional disputes in Canada. In the United States, 
since 1949, there has been an experiment in private adjudication by the 
National Joint Board for Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Con- 
struction Industry. See Crispo and Arthurs, " Jurisdictional Disputes in 
Canada: A Study in Frustration," (1963) 3 Current Law and Social Problems 
(Univ.West.Ont.). 
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establishment of a similar institution which, apart from its obvious 
function of ongoing law reform, provides a forum for the amicable 
interchange of views between labour, management and government. 
CONCLUSION: LABOUR LORE AND LABOUR LAW 
This, then, is a synopsis of the Danish system of industrial relations 
which is conceded generally to be one of the most effective and 
sophisticated in the world. 
To say that the Danes have " solved " labour relations is to 
overstate the case by far. In 1960, for example, a rash of wildcat 
strikes occurred, largely as a result of the dissatisfaction of workers 
who felt that their interests had been submerged in the voting in 
the preceding general negotiations. But if this disruption revealed 
one of the danger-spots in the Danish system-bloc voting-its 
aftermath is equally instructive. Some employers sought to buy 
peace by granting wage increases, which resulted in the imposition 
of sanctions by the D.A., for breach of its rules requiring employer 
solidarity. On the other side, the L.O., realising the illegality of 
the conduct of the strikers, settled virtually all cases in which the 
remedies of the Labour Court were sought. In the 1961 negotia- 
tions, again, certain structural weaknesses emerged which ulti- 
mately required parliamentary intervention to impose a settlement 
in the transportation industry. No doubt the system will encounter 
crises in the future as it has in the past. But the relevance for 
North Americans of the Danish system is not so much its present 
performance as its demonstrated long-run ability to contain conflict 
by an imaginative use of institutional devices. 
By way of recapitulation, these institutional devices can be 
grouped under three headings: First, centralised industry-wide 
bargaining conducted by professionals in accordance with agreed- 
upon and firm procedural rules. Secondly, private law-making with 
its implicit commitment by both parties to abide by the law. 
Thirdly, private processes of adjudication and dispute-settlement 
in a variety of forums tailor-made for various types of conflicts. 
Sceptics, and indeed realists, will properly point out that the 
Danish system is the result of historical, social and economic forces 
which have produced a labour lore which is uniquely Danish. 
Undoubtedly the September Agreement of 1899 was possible 
because of an existing acceptance of employer *and employee 
organisation which had no parallel in North America. Undoubt- 
edly, too, the September Agreement in turn created an atmosphere 
in which labour-management adjustments through private law- 
making were facilitated. Thus, over the years, the parties have 
accumulated a fund of mutual trust and respect upon which they 
274 International and Comparative Law Quarterly [VOL. 12 
may draw in moments of conflict. There can be no doubt that the 
lore evokes the law, and that in turn the law generates lore. But 
to conclude that North Americans are by fate debarred from profit- 
ing from the Danish experience is to be hypnotised by the 
chicken-egg conundrum. 
If the Danes can teach us no other lesson, they can teach us 
this: it is possible, beginning from a crisis situation, to build upon 
the mutual interdependence of labour and management a legal 
institutional framework capable of accommodating the opposing 
interests-given only a will to do so."9 
APPENDIX ONE 
THE MAIN AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 18, 1960, BETWEEN THE DANISH 
EMPLOYERS' CONFEDERATION AND THE DANISH FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONs 
Section 1 
Subsection 1. In recognition of the desirability of having questions concerning 
wages and working conditions settled by the conclusion of collective agree- 
ments, if necessary with the participation of the central organisations, the 
central organisations and their members bind themselves neither directly nor 
indirectly to obstruct employers and workers from organising themselves 
within the organisational framework of the central organisations. 
Subsection 2. By a collective agreement is understood (cf. The Permanent 
Court of Arbitration Act, sections 4B and 17) an agreement concerning 
wages and working conditions between a workers' organisation on the one 
hand and either an employers' organisation or an individual employer (firm) 
on the other. 
Section 2 
Subsection 1. When a collective agreement has been concluded, and for its 
duration, no stoppage of work (strike, blockade, lockout or boycott) may be 
effected within the scope of the agreement unless warranted by the Standard 
Rules for the Settlement of Labour Disputes or by existing collective agree- 
ments. Sympathetic strikes or sympathetic lockouts may, however, be effected 
in accordance with current agreements and legal practice. 
Subsection 2. Disputes as to whether an agreement exists or concerning the 
scope of the agreement shall be settled by industrial arbitration. 
Subsection 3. No stoppage of work may lawfully be effected unless approved 
by at least three-quarters of the votes cast by a body competent according 
to the statutes of the organisation in question and unless notice has been 
served in accordance with the provisions of subsection 4. The only exceptions 
to this rule are the cases of stoppage of work mentioned in the Standard 
Rules, section 5, subsection 2. 
Subsection 4. The intent to submit a proposal of stoppage of work of such 
a body shall be brought to the attention of the Executive Committee of the 
other central organisation in writing and by registered mail at least fourteen 
39 Indeed, there is evidence of widespread interest in Canada, at least, in the 
Scandinavian industrial relations systems. See, e.g., Report of Fact-Finding 
Body re Labour Legislation (Province of Nova Scotia, 1962) at p. 27: 
" We feel that there is much in the Swedish plan that should recommend 
it to management-labour bodies in Nova Scotia and elsewhere in 
Canada. ... We suggest, therefore, that representatives of management 
and labour in Nova Scotia undertake an exhaustive study of the Swedish 
plan . 
. . 
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days before the proposed stoppage of work is to take effect and the decision 
of the body shall in the same way be made known to the other party at least 
seven days before the stoppage of work is to begin. 
Subsection 5. The two central organisations as well as their affiliated 
organisations shall be bound not to support, but by all reasonable means to 
prevent, unlawful stoppages of work and, if an unlawful stoppage of work 
should take place, to attempt to have it brought to a conclusion. 
Subsection 6. A strike or lockout is considered to exist if a workshop or 
other place of work is systematically being evacuated or gradually closed 
down as part of a labour dispute. 
Subsection 7. During a labour dispute between the parties to the present 
agreement or their members and unaffiliated workers' or employers' organisa- 
tions or individual undertakings, no support may be given to the unaffiliated 
organisation or undertaking by any party bound by this agreement. An 
organisation or undertaking joining one of the central organisations or an 
association organised by them shall not be regarded as unaffiliated, provided 
that no stoppage of work was taking place at the time of application for 
membership or that such stoppage had not been clearly announced after 
unsuccessful negotiations. 
Section 3 
The central organisations shall be responsible for ensuring that agreements 
concluded between them are respected and carried out by all affiliated 
organisations. 
Section 4 
Subsection 1. The parties agree that the employers' right to direct and 
distribute work and to use what labour may in their judgment be suitable 
shall, with regard to the workers, be exercised in a responsible manner and 
in such a way as not to violate their rights under existing agreements. 
Subsection 2. In the case where labour has been engaged for a specified 
piece work without any reservation, the working conditions may not be 
changed unless the employer concerned compensates the workers for any 
financial loss resulting from the change. Disputes in this respect shall be 
settled by customary procedure (joint meeting, mediation or arbitration). 
Subsection 3. The right to dismiss individual workers must not be exercised 
in an arbitrary manner and complaints of alleged unreasonable dismissals 
shall therefore be dealt with according to the following rules: 
(a) In the case of the dismissal of a worker who has reached the age of 
20 and has been continually employed at the undertaking concerned for at 
least one year, the worker in question is entitled to demand information about 
the cause of his dismissal. 
(b) If it is claimed by a worker or his organisation that the dismissal is 
unreasonable and not founded on circumstances connected with the worker 
or the undertaking, a local discussion of the dismissal between representatives 
of the management and of the workers of the undertaking may be demanded. 
(c) If no agreement is reached at the local discussion and the national 
union (or association of unions) concerned insists on the continuation of the 
case, the organisations shall immediately initiate negotiations. 
(d) If such negotiations are unsuccessful, the national union (or associa- 
tion of unions) interested in the case shall, within fifteen days of the 
negotiations between the organisations, have the right to demand that the 
case be considered by a permanent board set up by the central organisations. 
This board is to consist of two representatives selected by each of the central 
organisations and a chairman and umpire selected by the central organisations 
from among the members of the Supreme Court. If agreement about the 
selection cannot be arrived at, the umpire shall be designated by the President 
of the Supreme Court. The appointments shall be valid for three calendar 
years at a time and two substitutes shall be appointed for each of the four 
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board members. Before considering a case, the board shall be joined by a 
representative from each of the two agreement parties directly involved. No 
board member may have any direct connection with the management or the 
workers of the undertaking whose case is being considered. 
(e) The board shall hand down a reasoned decision, and in the cases where 
the board finds the dismissal in question to be unreasonable and not founded 
on circumstances relating to the worker or the undertaking, the board may 
decide that the employer shall pay to the dismissed worker a compensation, 
the amount of which shall depend on the particulars of the case and on the 
seniority of the improperly dismissed worker, but which cannot exceed 
thirteen weeks' wages calculated on the basis of the average earnings of the 
dismissed worker during the preceding year. 
Section 5 
Subsection 1. Supervisors, foremen, and persons in corresponding positions 
who represent the employer in relation to the workers, may be required by 
the employer, after consultation with the person in question, not to become 
a member of any workers' organisation. 
Subsection 2. The right conferred on the employer by subsection 1 cannot be 
asserted merely because a worker is engaged as a salaried employee, if other- 
wise he does not fulfil the requirements for being recognised as a foreman 
in the sense of the Main Agreement. 
Subsection 3. The interested supervisors' organisations should be permitted 
to be represented at meetings held to deal with disagreements about the above 
provisions. 
Section 6 
The parties will oppose possible attempts to keep persons out of workers' 
organisations on the plea of partnership agreements which do not make the 
persons in question real partners in the firm. 
Section 7 
Subsection 1. The period of notice to terminate agreements concerning price 
lists and other working conditions shall be three months, unless otherwise 
agreed. 
Subsection 2. Even if an agreement has been denounced or has expired, the 
parties shall, nevertheless, be bound to comply with its provisions until 
another agreement has taken its place or stoppage of work has been effected 
in accordance with the rules of section 2. 
Section 8 
The central organisations agree that shop steward rules should be inserted 
in the collective agreements whenever the character of the working conditions 
makes it practical. 
Section 9 
Subsection 1. The two central organisations will promote co-operation among 
the organisations and work for peaceful and stable working conditions in the 
undertakings through joint industrial committees or other suitable bodies. 
Subsection 2. Collective agreements should aim at wage systems which will 
promote productivity and in addition give the workers an opportunity for 
higher earnings than ordinary time rates, because normally, when it is 
possible to have a job done both as piece work and as work paid by ordinary 
time rates, a greater amount of work and thereby higher earnings can be 
expected by piece work rates than by ordinary time rates. 
Subsection 3. No party may prevent a worker from doing as much and as 
good work as his abilities and training permit. 
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Section 10 
In the case of an alleged breach of this Main Agreement as well as in the 
case of an alleged breach of any other collective agreement entered into by 
the central organisations or their members, a joint meeting shall be held with 
the co-operation of the central organisations before a complaint is brought 
before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
Section 11 
The unions, associations and industrial undertakings affiliated with the 
two central organisations cannot, by resigning from the central organisations, 
release themselves from the obligations which they have accepted under the 
present Main Agreement. They continue to apply until this Main Agreement 
is denounced by either of the central organisations. 
Section 19 
Subsection 1. This Main Agreement shall remain in force until it is denounced 
by a notice of six months to terminate on October 1 of any year, although not 
earlier than October 1, 1966. The central organisation that might desire to 
amend the Main Agreement shall inform the opposite party to that effect, 
six months prior to the denunciation, after which negotiations shall be com- 
menced with the purpose of reaching agreement and thereby avoiding 
denunciation of the Main Agreement. 
Subsection 2. If, after denunciation has been made, negotiations regarding 
a renewal of the Main Agreement have not been concluded by the October 1 
in question, the Main Agreement shall remain in force although the time of 
denunciation has expired, until the collective agreements in force have been 
replaced by new ones. The Main Agreement shall cease to apply when the 
new collective agreements come into force. 
Section 13 
This Main Agreement, which replaces the Agreement of September 5, 
1899, will take effect simultaneously with the renewal of the agreements now 
in force. 
APPENDIX TWO 
RULES FOR NEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENTS 
AGI1EEIMENT BETWEEN THE DANISH EMPLOYERS' CONFEDERATION AND THE 
NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF DANISH TRADE UNIONS, DATED MAY 11, 1960 
Section 1 
(1) All the fields covered by agreements and comprising organisations and 
undertakings affiliated to the two central organisations shall be divided into 
eight groups, viz.: 
(i) metal trades; 
(ii) textile and clothing industries; 
(iii) food and drinks, and allied industries; 
(iv) other industries, including the woodwork industry; 
(v) building and construction; 
(vi) graphic industries, including the paper article and cardboard box 
industries; 
(vii) transport; 
(viii) employees in commerce and offices. 
(2) Any disagreements about the placing of the individual agreements in 
the groups shall be decided by a Board appointed by the central 
organisations. 
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(3) Negotiation of agreements within these groups shall, as hitherto, be 
carried on within each particular field: Provided that the central organisa- 
tions would recommend that the trades covered by the individual groups 
consult together about the progress of negotiations and make efforts to 
provide co-ordination to the widest possible extent. 
Section 2 
All agreements shall have the same date of expiration, viz., March 1. 
Section 3 
In order that the period of negotiation may be used to the best advantage 
for objective negotiations between the parties, the following rules shall 
apply : 
(1) The party wanting an existing agreement to be revised shall before 
November 1 of the year preceding expiration of agreements submit complete 
proposals for such revision. 
(2) Subject to the provision of section 6, where no proposal for revision 
is submitted by any of the parties, the agreement shall remain in force as it 
stands. 
(3) Negotiations between the suborganisations shall be commenced 
immediately on receipt of the proposals for revision. The negotiations shall 
be carried on intensively and be brought to a conclusion not later than 
December 1. 
(4) If the negotiations lead to a result that is accepted by both parties, 
the agreements concerned have thereby been brought to a final conclusion. 
The results achieved shall be without prejudice to any other results. 
(5) In the negotiations between the suborganisations as well as with the 
co-operation of the central organisations, either party (central organisation) 
may request the co-operation of a subconciliator in the negotiations, and 
this may take place already from the commencement of negotiations. 
(6) If by December 1 no agreement has been reached between the 
negotiation committees of the suborganisations about new agreements, the 
matters at issue shall pass immediately to the central organisations for 
consideration. 
Section 4 
Immediately on conclusion of negotiations between the suborganisations 
both parties shall be bound to submit a detailed and precise report to their 
respective central organisations giving information on 
(a) the agreements hitherto in force; 
(b) any questions on which agreement may have been reached; 
(c) any questions still outstanding, with indication of any proposals and 
other documents exchanged between the parties. 
Section 5 
(1) To deal with the remaining disagreements with a particular view to 
consideration of the general questions, the central organisations shall each 
appoint a negotiation committee to be composed of six representatives. 
(2) The negotiation committees of the central organisations shall 
immediately after December 1 commence negotiations on the general questions 
and any other questions that may be selected by the negotiation committees. 
(3) By general questions shall be understood such as may be likely to be 
relevant to all or the majority of the fields covered by agreements, such as 
demands relating to hours of work, changes in rates of wages, changes in 
rules governing the annual holiday with pay and governing holidays other 
than Sundays, social amenities, and questions about the duration of 
agreements. 
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(4) Other questions that may be taken up by the negotiation committees 
shall be such as are of the same nature as the general questions referred to 
above but which have been raised only within one or more of the groups set 
out in section 1. 
(5) Besides, the negotiation committees of the central organisations shall 
decide which of the demands put forward may be regarded as general, and 
what other questions shall be considered by the negotiation committees. 
(6) Any disagreements about the rules laid down above shall be decided 
by the Agreement Board [of 1939, Ed.]. 
(7) If these negotiations conclude in a result that is accepted by both 
parties, that result shall form part of the proposals for new agreements 
between the parties in the eight groups set out in section 1. 
Section 6 
(1) If during the negotiations between the central organisations or with 
the co-operation of the conciliator agreement is reached on one or more of 
the general questions, the result shall apply to the entire field covered by 
the Confederation of Danish Trade Unions and the Danish Employers' 
Confederation, unless the nature of the agreement or the preceding negotia- 
tions militate against it, or if agreement has been reached during negotiations 
between the suborganisations also in respect of the general questions. 
(2) The intention is to avoid unreasonable or unfair results; in cases of 
doubt, the matter may be decided by the Agreement Board. The case shall 
be submitted through one of the central organisations. 
Section 7 
(1) If the negotiations on the general demands between the negotiation 
committees of the central organisations have led to no result by December 20, 
the Conciliation Board shall be requested to join the committee, on the one 
hand to be informed of the attitude of the parties and, on the other, to 
preside over the negotiations, which shall be expedited as much as possible 
in order that a result may be achieved by January 20. 
(2) With a view to the best possible utilisation of the period of negotiation, 
the Conciliation Board shall be requested to commence work immediately in 
the case of any outstanding issues after January 20. 
Section 8 
Concurrently with the negotiations between the negotiation committees of 
the central organisations on the general questions, negotiations on the remain- 
ing questions shall be continued under the chairmanship of the central 
organisations. If agreement is reached, the result shall stand over till the 
subsequent joint voting in the groups [cf. subsection (2) of section 11]. 
Section 9 
(1) Provided agreement cannot be reached on the remaining matters at 
issue during the negotiations carried on under the chairmanship of the 
central organisations, the parties may, on conclusion of the negotiations, 
decide that the remaining disagreements on non-general questions shall be 
considered, wholly or in part, by a joint committee [cf. section 10]. The 
demands on which agreement for consideration by a joint committee cannot 
be reached shall be referred to the Conciliation Board. 
(2) Following consultation with the central organisations the Conciliation 
Board shall decide whether the issues shall be subject to direct conciliation 
by the Conciliation Board, possibly through subconciliators, or be referred for 
final decision by the joint committee [cf. section 10]. 
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Section 10 
(1) The joint committees which accordingly shall deal with questions of a 
non-general nature shall be composed of one representative of each of the 
two central organisations, one representative of each side of the group 
concerned [cf. section 1] and one representative of each of the parties to 
the agreement. It shall be the business of the joint committee to mediate 
between the parties and, in the case of a majority of the members of the 
committee being in favour hereof, it may decide the question with binding 
effect on both parties. Any questions which do not get a majority of the 
members of the committee shall be decided by an umpire appointed by the 
committee. Where agreement cannot be reached on appointment of an 
umpire, such appointment shall be left to the Conciliation Board. 
(2) In the course of their deliberations for determining the fair price for 
the work in question, the joint committee may, for purposes of information, 
require all particulars on conditions of work, prices, wages and piece-work 
earning in the particular trade. Where local price-lists are concerned, due 
regard shall be had to the local conditions prevailing. 
(3) The joint committee or the umpire shall not be entitled to decide any 
questions of a general nature [cf. section 5]. Any disagreements as to 
whether a demand is of such nature shall be decided by the Agreement 
Board. 
(4) Any questions being subject to consideration and decision under the 
above rules shall as far as possible have been considered and decided by the 
date when new agreements shall come into force, unless the parties agree to 
postpone the decision till after conclusion of the negotiation of agreements. 
Section 11 
(1) Each of the eight groups shall decide, by group, on the attitude to 
adopt to any final drafts for renewal of agreements. In voting, the individual 
group cannot be linked with others; within each particular group the rules 
shall be the same as in the Conciliation (Labour Disputes) Act. 
(2) The joint group voting shall cover fields for which agreements are 
concluded subsequent to December 1, irrespective of the date of voting. 
(3) The joint group voting shall not cover fields in which the parties 
have concluded agreements by themselves prior to December 1 [cf. subsections 
(3) and (4) of section 3]. 
Section 12 
In the case of any voting on draft agreements being the result of direct 
negotiation, the rules of voting shall be the same as in the Conciliation 
(Labour Disputes) Act. 
Section 13 
If the negotiations with or without the co-operation of the conciliator fail 
to provide agreement on the demands put forward, either party shall be 
entitled to give notice of their intention to effect a stoppage of work as from 
the date of expiration of the agreements; similarly, a sympathetic conflict 
may be instituted under the provisions of labour law. 
Section 14 
(1) The last date of due denunciation of agreements shall be February 14. 
(2) Any agreements that have not been denounced shall continue to be 
in force until they are duly denounced in pursuance of their own rules of 
denunciation. 
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Section 15 
Provided agreement has been reached on the general questions between 
the central organisations before March 1, the changes agreed upon relating 
to wages, overtime payment, payment for work in shifts, or any similar 
changes in regard to wages shall come into force as from the commencement 
of the first pay-week after March 1. 
Section 16 
This Agreement shall remain in force until it is denounced by a notice of 
six months to expire on a July 1. 
